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The Eurozone crisis does not necessarily prove that a
monetary union also requires fiscal/political union.
by Blog Admin
A common argument is that the Eurozone crisis necessitates greater fiscal and political
integration among countries using the single currency. Simon Wren-Lewis disputes this idea,
arguing that we should be cautious about forming concrete conclusions from a single
observation. He states that the lesson of Eurozone failure is largely about bad design, rather
than disproof of concept.
Is a monetary union without f iscal/polit ical union doomed? This seems to be a very common
view at the moment. The view that the Eurozone will have to move to f iscal union, which
implies some f orm of  polit ical union, comes f rom two directions.
First, those working in the polit ical unions that are the United States or the United Kingdom, know combined
monetary and f iscal unions can work. From this perspective, the monetary only union of  the Eurozone was
a largely untried experiment, and it appears to be f ailing. (For just one example of  this view, see Acemoglu
and Robinson here.) Let me rephrase that: it is f ailing. The perpetual crisis of  the markets may be over as a
result of  OMT [1], but the crisis that is unemployment in the periphery just gets worse. (Kevin O’Rourke
puts it bluntly but accurately here.)
Second, within the Eurozone itself , there has always been a powerf ul lobby f or f urther integration. It is
theref ore not surprising that actors like the Commission see f urther integration as the longer term solution
to the Eurozone’s problems.
Yet we should be very cautious about making generalisations f rom a single observation. It may be worth
reminding ourselves about why the Eurozone has not been a f air test of  monetary union without f iscal
union:
First, the crisis of  competit iveness was partly a result of  a mistaken belief  in the market that def ault risk on
everyone’s debt was similar to German debt, a mistake that is unlikely to occur again in decades. In the
years bef ore the recession, no attempt was made to use f iscal policy to of f set overheating in periphery
countries. (For more on why countercyclical policy is key, see Antonio Fatas here.)
Second, in probably only one case, Greece, was there a clear problem of  underlying f iscal excess. Yet
instead of  recognising the need f or def ault early on, the union made a f utile attempt to avoid it by replacing
private debt with intergovernmental lending, which had disastrous consequences. This major and avoidable
error produced the worst moment of  the crisis, when Greece was threatened with exit. It continues to
impose a disastrous degree of  austerity on Greece.
Third, the f iscal posit ion of  other Eurozone economies became crit ical because the ECB ref used to act as
a lender of  last resort. If  the ECB had introduced its OMT programme two years earlier than it did, the crisis
might well have dissipated very quickly. This is hardly wisdom f rom hindsight, as anyone reading Paul De
Grauwe (or indeed my blog) will know. Market reaction always had much more to do with the ECB than the
f iscal posit ion of  the countries involved, an observation that inspired my f irst blog post and which research
conf irms.
Fourth, the current double dip recession in the Eurozone is largely about a collective f ailure of  f iscal and
monetary policy. The posit ion of  the Eurozone would look signif icantly better if  the ECB acted more like the
US Fed, and if  Germany and other f iscally untroubled economies were less obsessed with austerity. Neither
has much to do with the absence of  f iscal union.
To use evidence f rom one very badly designed test case to condemn the whole concept of  monetary union
without polit ical union is f ar too hasty. It is also potentially very dangerous. We should not f orget that
monetary union itself  was encouraged by a belief  that the f ixed exchange rate regime that preceded EMU
was untenable because of  market pressure. (For more on the origins of  the euro see Harold James here.)
The lesson of  Eurozone f ailure so f ar is mainly about bad design, rather than disproof  of  concept. If  this
f ailure leads to a f iscal and monetary union imposed f rom above on an unwilling electorate, by an elite that
played such a big part in creating the current f ailure, we may go on to f ind out that a badly conceived
polit ical union could be even more disastrous than a badly designed monetary union.
[1] The ECB’s programme to become a conditional lender of  last resort
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